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I.   INTRODUCTION
According to Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, the only summa-
ries of evidence that may be introduced at trial are those that re-
capitulate the contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or
photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court.1 Rule
1006, however, does not mention the admissibility of summaries
of prior in-court testimony, nor does any other rule of evidence.
Further, the notes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Evidence do not address the admissibility of summary
testimony.
Federal courts have nonetheless expanded Rule 611(a), which
Congress drafted to restate the power and obligation of the com-
mon law judge, to include the admission of summary testimony.
Court decisions have deemed summary testimony admissible
during the prosecution’s case-in-chief, when a federal agent
merely repeats the testimony of prior witnesses.2 In effect, the
courts have allowed the prosecution to put the credibility of prior
witnesses at issue for a second time. This violates the Federal
Rules of Evidence because of the extreme prejudice to the defen-
dant. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
warned other federal courts in 1979 that such summary testi-
                                                                                                             
*  Attorney General’s Honor Program attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons, Southeast Regional Office, Atlanta, Georgia. B.S., Florida International
University, 1992; J.D., Florida State University, 1996. The author thanks Professor Char-
les W. Ehrhardt, Florida State University College of Law, for his assistance.
1. FED. R. EVID. 1006.
2. United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266
(1995).
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mony was problematic,3 the Fourth Circuit allowed this type of
testimony in violation of the Rules as recently as 1995.4
This Comment examines the federal courts’ recent expansion
of the use of summaries at trial. Part II explores the background
and purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 and examines how
federal courts have limited the use of the Rule with respect to
summaries of in-court testimony. Part III discusses how the
courts have expanded Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a), beginning
with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Scales .5
Scales was the first decision to recognize Rule 611(a) as a basis
for the use of summaries under the Rule’s “mode and order” lan-
guage.6 Part IV analyzes how federal courts have since progres-
sively expanded the use of Rule 611(a), a process that culminated
in the Fourth Circuit’s recent application of the Rule in United
States v. Johnson .7 Finally, this Comment concludes that federal
courts have violated the purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence
by expanding Rule 611(a) and proposes that the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Federal Rules of Evidence address the issue to
clarify the scope and purpose of the Rule.
II.   FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 1006 AND ITS JUDICIALLY
INTERPRETED LIMITATIONS
Entitled “Summaries,” Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 provides:
The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photo-
graphs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be
presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The
originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for examina-
tion or copying, or both, by other parties at reasonable time and
place. The court may order that they be produced in court.8
Rule 1006 follows the common law tradition that recognized that
parties could prove the contents of voluminous writings in the
form of testimonial or written charts, summaries, or calculations
when the writings, because of their voluminous contents, could
not be examined in court without causing inconvenience or a
waste of time.9 The purpose of the Rule is simply “to allow the use
                                                                                                             
3. United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558, 564 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979).
4. Johnson, 54 F.3d at 1150.
5. Scales, 594 F.2d at 558.
6. Id. at 563.
7. 54 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995).
8. FED. R. EVID. 1006.
9. 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, ¶ 1006[01]
(1996).
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of summaries when the volume of documents being summarized
is so large as to make their use impractical or impossible; sum-
maries may also prove more meaningful to the judge and jury.”10
A proper foundation must be laid before a summary of volumi-
nous writings, recordings, or photographs will qualify as admis-
sible under Rule 1006.11 There are four requirements for such a
foundation: (1) the writings to be summarized must be too volu-
minous for convenient in-court examination;12 (2) the documents
underlying the summary must be admissible,13 unless they were
reasonably relied upon by an expert and used in his or her testi-
mony;14 (3) the original materials or duplicates must be made
available to the other parties for examination at a reasonable
place and time in advance of trial;15 and (4) the summaries must
accurately reflect the content of the original materials.16
                                                                                                             
10. United States v. Johnson, 594 F.2d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
964 (1979).
11. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 9, ¶ 1006[03].
12. “Contents of charts or summaries admitted as evidence under Rule 1006 must
fairly represent and be taken from underlying documentary proof which is too voluminous
for convenient in-court examination, and they must be accurate and nonprejudicial.”
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 332 (2nd ed.
1989) (citing United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558, 561-63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
946 (1979)).
13. Johnson, 594 F.2d at 1256 (“[C]ommentators and other courts have agreed that
Rule 1006 requires that the proponent of a summary establish that the underlying docu-
ments are admissible in evidence.”).
14. FED. R. EVID. 703:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opin-
ion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particu-
lar field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence.
15. United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“When the underlying
documents are not subject to examination by the opposing parties, the summary should
not be admitted into evidence.”); Wright v. Southwest Bank, 554 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir.
1977) (holding that summary is improper when opposing party is not provided with oppor-
tunity to examine original records).
Even though the original records need not be introduced into evidence, it is within the
court’s discretion whether to require production of the documents in court. Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1961) (“[I]t must be shown that
the summation accurately summarizes the materials involved by not referring to informa-
tion not contained in the original. . . . Usually the records or materials summarized must
first be made accessible to the opposing party for inspection and for use in cross-
examination.”); see also In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 289 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (explaining that because many important management decisions in the business
world are made through intelligent application of statistical and computer techniques, de-
fendants should be able to rely on the same techniques, including computer printouts, in
litigation).
16. White Indus., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049, 1070-71 (W.D. Mo.
1985) (excluding file summary where testimony showed that information in summary was
not contained in files “summarized” or elsewhere in record, nor within witness’s personal
knowledge).
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Once a party has established a proper foundation, it may offer
the summaries in written or oral form.17 The person responsible
for preparing the charts, summaries, or calculations is not spe-
cifically required to authenticate them on the witness stand.18
This practice departs from the custom that enabled the opposing
party to challenge the evidence by cross-examining the person
who put the evidence together.19 Instead, courts have allowed su-
pervisory personnel to attest to the accuracy and authenticity of
charts, summaries, and calculations, thus facilitating authenti-
cation of the evidence.20
Courts have interpreted Rule 1006 as applying only to sum-
maries of voluminous writings deemed to be admissible evi-
dence.21 Courts have also held, however, that Rule 611(a) properly
governs the use of summary charts and verbal summaries of prior
in-court witness testimony.22
III.   JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 611(A):
SUMMARIES AS PEDAGOGICAL DEVICES
Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) states that “[t]he court shall
exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogat-
ing witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the in-
terrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of
the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”23
According to the Advisory Committee’s note, item (1) of the
Rule restates the power and obligation of the judge under com-
mon law principles.24 In addition to addressing whether testi-
mony should be in the form of free narrative responses to specific
questions, item (1) covers such concerns as the order in which
witnesses are called, the presentation of evidence, the use of de-
monstrative evidence, and many other questions that only a
judge’s common sense and fairness can resolve.25 Item (2) ad-
                                                                                                             
17. See Nichols v. Upjohn Co., 610 F.2d 293, 294 (5th Cir. 1980).
18. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 9, ¶ 1006[06].
19. United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1005
(1990) (summary compiled from business records was properly admitted where FBI agent
testified concerning summary’s source).
20. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 9, ¶ 1006[06].
21. PAUL R. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 856
(1987).
22. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1158 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 266 (1995).
23. FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
24. FED. R. EVID. 611 advisory committee’s note.
25. Id. (citations omitted).
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dresses the needless consumption of time that is a trial court’s
daily concern.26 Item (3) calls on judges, under certain circum-
stances, to use their discretion to avoid harassment and undue
embarrassment during testimony.27 Such circumstances include
“the importance of the testimony, the nature of the inquiry, its
relevance to credibility, waste of time, and confusion.”28
Neither the text of Rule 611(a) nor the Advisory Committee’s
note address the admissibility of charts and statements summa-
rizing prior in-court witness testimony. In fact, authority for al-
lowing such summaries does not exist in the Federal Rules of
Evidence at all; rather, it stems from the Sixth Circuit’s decision
in United States v. Scales .29
Appealing from a conviction of conspiracy and nine counts of
unlawfully converting union assets to his personal use, the defen-
dant in Scales claimed in part that the trial judge had committed
reversible error by allowing Government Exhibit 145 into evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 and by allowing an FBI agent
to testify concerning the exhibit.30 The exhibit consisted of a series
of charts, the first of which summarized all of the charges the in-
dictment listed.31 The court held that admission of the first chart
was not prejudicial because it was clear that “the trial judge ha[d]
discretion to submit the indictment to the jury . . . as long as limit-
ing instructions [were] given to the effect that the indictment [was]
not to be considered as evidence of the guilt of the accused.”32
The remainder of Exhibit 145 consisted of a summary of ob-
jective proof that related to a number of the counts and overt acts
with which the defendant had been charged, as well as written
statements that union records did not contain certain informa-
tion, primarily authorization for travel.33 The FBI agent’s testi-
mony summarized and helped the jury organize the over 150 ex-
hibits that had already been admitted.34 The defendant claimed
that the agent’s testimony had prejudiced him because the agent
was not an expert and had therefore not authenticated the charts.35
The Sixth Circuit concluded that because the charts contained no
                                                                                                             
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 594 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979).
30. Id. at 559, 561.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 561-62.
33. Id. at 562.
34. Id. at 561-62.
35. Id. at 563.
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misleading or conclusory references and appeared to present
merely an organization of some of the undisputed objective evi-
dence, the exhibit was admissible under Rule 1006.36
Although the court admitted Exhibit 145 as evidence under
the guise of Rule 1006, it stated in dictum that, aside from Rule
1006, ample authority existed to support the admission of the
exhibit under Rule 611(a) because of the “established tradition,
both within this circuit and in other circuits, that permits a
summary of evidence to be put before the jury with proper limit-
ing instructions.”37 The court cited several income tax cases that
had allowed agents to testify to summary charts detailing clearly
objective evidence compiled from voluminous documents and cal-
culations.38 None of the summary charts used in the income tax
cases summarized prior in-court witness testimony. Finding that
there had never been any formal distinction between the use of
summaries in income tax cases and criminal cases, the Scales
court concluded that such summaries did not come under the
purview of Rule 1006, but rather were more properly admitted
under Rule 611(a) to aid the jury in its examination of the evi-
dence already before it.39
The court then went on, however, to state the dangers of per-
mitting such summary presentations in criminal cases, including
the possibility that a jury might either rely upon the alleged facts
in the summary as if they had already been proven or use the
summary as a substitute for assessing witness credibility.40 The
court resolved these dangers by requiring “guarding instructions”
to explain that the chart itself is not evidence but, instead, is
simply an aid in evaluating the evidence.41 The Scales court con-
cluded that because the facts summarized in the case were en-
tirely objective—meaning that no issue of witness credibility was
presented—the summaries did not undermine the defendant’s
theory of the case and therefore were admissible.42
The Scales court admitted the chart summary because it reflected
objective evidence already before the jury that did not include
                                                                                                             
36. Id. at 564.
37. Id. at 563.
38. Id. at 564 (citing United States v. Conlin, 551 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 831 (1977); United States v. Jalbert, 504 F.2d 892 (1st Cir. 1974)). Both Conlin and
Jalbert in turn cite Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
828 (1971), which involved misapplication of bank funds. See Conlin, 551 F.2d at 538; Jal-
bert, 504 F.2d at 894.
39. Scales, 594 F.2d at 563.
40. Id. at 564.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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summaries of witness testimony.43 The chart summary helped the
jury organize the government’s case, which had over 150 exhibits,
and, most importantly, did not put the credibility of any prior
witness at issue. The Scales standard has since been eroded by
the federal courts, however. This erosion has continued to the
point where summaries are being admitted that violate the pur-
pose and scope of the Federal Rules of Evidence.44 The Scales de-
cision, which interpreted Rule 611(a) as permitting the admission
of summaries under the Rule’s “mode and order” language,45 has
been cited during the past seventeen years as the leading
authority throughout the U.S. Courts of Appeals on the admis-
sion of summaries under Rule 611(a).46
The type of summary evidence at issue in Scales is known as a
“pedagogical device,” which is a method used to summarize tes-
timony and emphasize certain points.47 Judge Jack B. Weinstein’s
Evidence48 is the leading authority cited by judges and by evi-
dence authorities throughout the nation as the source of expla-
nation for the use of summaries as pedagogical devices.49 Accord-
ing to Judge Weinstein, these summaries should not be allowed
into the jury room during deliberations without the consent of all
parties because they are more akin to argument than evidence.50
                                                                                                             
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”).
45. Scales, 594 F.2d at 563.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 266 (1995); United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927, 935 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
867 (1988); United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1381 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 908 (1988); United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); United States v. Apodaca, 666 F.2d 89, 95 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982).
47. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 9, ¶ 1006[07]; RICE, supra note 21, at 860; 2
GREGORY P. JOSEPH AND STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA, § 5 (1994); see also
Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 431 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Exhibit 30 is clearly a
pedagogical device which merely summarizes and organizes data already in evidence.”);
United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The [government’s] use of
the chart . . . contributed to the clarity of the presentation to the jury, avoided needless
consumption of time and was a reasonable method of presenting the evidence.”)
48. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 9.
49. See United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1412 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 330 (1994); United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739, 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 914 (1991); United States v. Winn, 948 F.2d 145, 158 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 976 (1992).
50. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 9, ¶ 1006[07]; see also Gardner, 611 F.2d at 776
n.3 (holding that while it is better practice not to submit to jury charts that summarize
admitted evidence, no reversible error was committed). The circuits are split, however, as
to whether summaries are pedagogical devices under Rule 611(a) or evidence under Rule
1006, and whether the summary charts can go into the jury room for deliberations.
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 9, ¶ 1006[07]; see also United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d
739 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 914 (1991) (summary witness testimony explaining
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In addition, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to
admit the summaries.51
The problem, however, is not the Scales court’s interpretation
of summaries, which simply recognized objective evidence as
admissible when guarding instructions are given, but rather the
recent decisions that have expanded the language of Scales. As
discussed in the following section, federal courts have over-
stepped their bounds by admitting summaries that violate the
scope and purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence and erode the
protections that the Rules provide to each party at trial.
IV.   FROM A PEDAGOGICAL DEVICE TO A VIOLATION OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: THE EFFECT OF UNITED STATES V.
JOHNSON
The erosion of the Scales standard culminated in the Fourth
Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Johnson .52 This sec-
tion will analyze the cases cited by Johnson as support for its
reasoning, thus revealing the Johnson court’s erroneous interpre-
tation and application of Rule 611(a) case law.
The confusion in the U.S. Courts of Appeals as to the appro-
priate role that summaries play and how they should be admitted
at trial began with the Second Circuit’s decision in United States
v. Baccollo.53 The Baccollo court upheld the trial judge’s decision to
permit “the prosecution to introduce as evidence charts on which
there was represented primary evidence.”54 The court reasoned
                                                                                                             
organizational chart fell under Rule 611(a), not Rule 1006); Gomez v. Great Lakes Steel
Div., Nat’l Steel Corp., 803 F.2d 250, 257 (6th Cir. 1986) (concluding that summary charts,
although used as a pedagogical device, were improperly admitted because court failed to
give limiting instruction explaining exhibit’s nature and purpose); Gardner, 611 F.2d at
776 (court had discretion under Rule 611(a) to admit chart that avoided needless con-
sumption of time, contributed to the clarity of the presentation to the jury, and was rea-
sonable method of presenting evidence); United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558, 563-64 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979) (summaries are admissible pursuant to Rule 1006
and Rule 611(a)).
51. Winn, 948 F.2d at 159:
[S]ummary charts are, in the trial court’s discretion, ordinarily admissible
when: (1) the charts are based on competent evidence before the jury; (2) the
primary evidence used to construct the charts is available to the other side for
comparison in order that the correctness of the summary may be tested; (3) the
person who prepared the charts is available for cross-examination; and (4) the
jury is properly instructed concerning their consideration of the charts.
See also United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1381 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
908 (1988); Gomez, 803 F.2d at 257; United States v. Collins, 596 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir.
1979).
52. 54 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995).
53. 725 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1983).
54. Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
1996]                       SUMMARIZING TESTIMONY 169
that the charts were properly admitted because the trial judge
had explained to the jury how it should consider the charts.55
Although Baccollo held that the charts were admissible evi-
dence, in contrast to the general consensus that a summary chart
is not evidence but a pedagogical device, careful examination of
the decision shows that the court did not mention whether the
charts summarized testimony. Instead, the court’s entire discus-
sion of the issue only indicated that the charts reflected primary
evidence offered by the prosecution.56 The opinion discussed nei-
ther the type of evidence the chart reflected nor at which stage of
the trial the chart was admitted into evidence, nor did it discuss
the defendant’s argument against the chart’s admission.57
Baccollo should thus be given little or no weight by courts ad-
dressing the admission of summary testimony because of the
Baccollo court’s lack of discussion of the issue. Nevertheless, the
Johnson court cited Baccollo and other cases58 in support of its
decision to allow the use of summary charts and summary testi-
mony.59
The circuits are split as to whether a summary chart should be
admitted and allowed into the jury room or whether it is just a
pedagogical device that should be admitted to aid the jury in
weighing the evidence that has already been presented.60 The
                                                                                                             
55. Id.
56. The court devoted two sentences to discussing the admission of summary testimony:
Defendant’s third point with respect to the substantive counts is that the dis-
trict judge permitted the prosecution to introduce as evidence charts on which
there was represented primary evidence which was offered by the prosecution
and admitted by the court. The admissibility of such charts, provided their
function is explained to the jury, as it was in this case by Judge Mishler, has
long been recognized.
Id.
57. The only discussion concerning the defendant’s arguments came at the very end of
the opinion, where the court reasoned that the evidence before the jury was adequate to
permit the jury to infer that there was only one conspiracy. Id. at 174.
58. United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1151 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1081 (1990) (jury is allowed to have charts in jury room during deliberations as long
as judge properly instructs jury that it is not to consider charts as evidence); United States
v. Goldberg, 401 F.2d 644, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1099 (1969) (jury
instructions not abuse of discretion where trial judge explained that charts were not inde-
pendent evidence but rather only representations of other admitted evidence).
59. United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1159 n.10, 1159-60 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995).
60. Compare United States v. Wood, 943 F.2d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (pedagogical
devices summarizing previously admitted testimony or documents “should not be admitted
into evidence or otherwise be used by the jury during deliberations”) and United States v.
Seelig, 622 F.2d 207, 214 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980) (holding that such sum-
maries should be accompanied by limiting instruction that summary does not itself constitute
evidence) with United States v. Poschwatta, 829 F.2d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1987) (court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting charts into evidence, although better practice is to admit
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jury hears the testimony in both instances, with the difference
being whether the document is admitted into the jury room as
evidence in the case. Johnson reconciled this difference by hold-
ing that “the concern should not be so much with the formal ad-
mission of the summaries as it is with the manner in which the
district court instructs the jury to consider the chart.”61 The court
reasoned that whether the chart was technically admitted into
evidence was not as important as whether the jury “is taking a
close look at the evidence upon which that chart is based” and not
relying upon the chart as independent evidence.62
The Johnson court held that the trial judge’s instructions fo-
cusing the jury on the evidence rather than on the summary tes-
timony were sufficient,63 thereby allowing testimony that simply
summarized that of prior witnesses and put the credibility of
those witnesses at issue for a second time. The Scales court
warned of this problem when it recognized that Rule 611(a) could
be used instead of Rule 1006 to admit testimony summarizing
objective evidence.64
One of main issues the Johnson defendant argued on appeal
was that the district court had abused its discretion and commit-
ted reversible error when it admitted part of FBI Agent Richard
Hudson’s summary testimony.65 Agent Hudson testified about an
organizational chart that reflected his compilation of the prior in-
court testimony of thirty co-conspirators, and presented founda-
tional testimony in support of the chart.66 In addition, Agent
Hudson verbally summarized the prior in-court testimony of the
thirty co-conspirators in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion.67 The Fourth Circuit held that under Rule 611(a), the district
                                                                                                             
charts only as testimonial aid for jury). See also RICE, supra note 21, at 856. Rice states that
courts disagree over the evidentiary status of summaries, with some courts improperly hold-
ing that summaries are not evidence and restricting their use to assisting the jury in under-
standing and using the underlying facts and data already in the record. Id. (citing United
States v. Atchley, 699 F.2d 1055 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Nathan, 536 F.2d 988 (2d
Cir. 1976)). Rice goes on to say that the correctly interpreted evidentiary status of summaries
was spelled out in United States v. Smyth, 556 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1977), which held that the
lower court properly admitted certain FBI computer printouts into evidence. RICE, supra note
21, at 857 (citing Smyth, 556 F.2d at 1184). Rice reconciles these differences by claiming that
the courts have erroneously interpreted summary evidence by failing to distinguish between
its use as a substitute for primary evidence under Rule 1006 and its use as pedagogical device
to aid the jury in evidence organization. Id. at 858.
61. Johnson, 54 F.3d at 1159.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1160.
64. 594 F.2d at 564.
65. Johnson, 54 F.3d at 1156.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1157.
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court had not erred in admitting the summary chart, the founda-
tional testimony for the chart, or the testimony summarizing that
of the prior in-court witnesses.68 The court based its conclusion
upon the large number of witnesses and extensive evidence that
the government had presented, as well as the district court’s
curative instructions to the jury.69
The court split its discussion of summary evidence, addressing
first the admissibility of the summary chart and then discussing
the admissibility of the summary testimony.70 The court looked to
the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Pinto 71 as a good
example of how a court should apply Rule 611(a) in admitting
summary charts.72
A.   Summary Charts as Admissible Evidence
Pinto involved the prosecution of several defendants for con-
spiracy to import cocaine.73 The government introduced into evi-
dence summary charts that reflected wiretaps, telephone calls,
the names of individuals that participated in the telephone con-
versations, the telephone numbers used, and the addresses where
the telephone calls were placed or received.74 The Pinto court held
that because the trial judge had determined that the charts would
be helpful to the jury and were not cumulative, it had not commit-
ted reversible error by admitting the charts into evidence or allow-
ing them into the jury room during deliberations.75
The Johnson court set forth two guiding principles that courts
should use when reviewing a district court’s admission of a sum-
mary chart into evidence under Rule 611(a). First, the court should
determine whether the summary chart aids the jury in ascertain-
ing the truth.76 Second, the court should consider the possible
                                                                                                             
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1162.
70. Id. at 1157, 1161.
71. 850 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867 (1988).
72. Johnson, 54 F.3d at 1158.
73. Pinto, 850 F.2d at 929.
74. Id. at 935. The opinion does not make clear whether all of the information sum-
marized on the charts was already in evidence. The opinion does state, however, that dur-
ing the ten-week trial, numerous witnesses and voluminous evidence were presented by
the government, including references to 66 wiretaps of telephone calls placed to some 35
telephone numbers. Id.
75. Id.
76. The court cited Pinto and Scales in support of this prong of the two-part test. Id. at
1159 (citing Pinto, 850 F.2d at 935; United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558, 563 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979)). The court listed several factors that a trial judge should employ
when making this determination, such as the complexity of the case, the length of the trial,
and any confusion that a large number of witnesses and exhibits may cause. Id.
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prejudice to the defendant that would result if the summary chart
were allowed into evidence.77 The Johnson court described this
second prong as “essentially an analysis under Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.”78
The summary chart admitted into evidence in Johnson re-
flected the testimony of thirty prior witnesses called by the gov-
ernment during its case-in-chief, twenty-eight of whom were co-
conspirators or had direct dealings with the drug conspiracy.79
The government called Agent Hudson, who had prepared the
chart after the witnesses had testified, to testify as to the organi-
zation and creation of the chart.80 Agent Hudson also summarized
the prior in-court testimony reflected in the chart while he dis-
cussed the chart’s organization.81
The admission of the summary violated the standard that the
Scales court adopted when it recognized that Rule 611(a) could be
used as authority to admit summaries as long as the summaries
contained only objective evidence and not evidence that put wit-
ness credibility at issue.82 The summary chart presented by Agent
Hudson was not comprised of objective evidence because it re-
flected prior in-court witness testimony.83 The Johnson court
cited Pinto and Scales as leading cases that supported the ad-
mission of the summary chart into evidence.84 Nevertheless, the
court violated the Pinto and Scales standard that allows only
summary charts reflecting objective evidence.85
Overlooking the prejudice to the defendant that resulted from
the admission of the summary chart, the Johnson court found
that the district court had taken all of the appropriate measures
required under the second prong of Pinto to ensure that the jury
was properly instructed as to the weight it was to give the chart.86
                                                                                                             
77. Id.
78. Id. Rule 403 states: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403.
79. Johnson, 54 F.3d at 1160.
80. Id. at 1156-58.
81. Id. at 1157.
82. See 594 F.2d at 564.
83. Note that the summary chart did not reflect objective evidence such as the certain
number of wiretaps, addresses, or telephone numbers that the Pinto court admitted into
evidence under Rule 611(a). See United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927, 935 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 867 (1988).
84. Id. at 1158-59.
85. Scales, 594 F.2d at 564; Pinto, 850 F.2d at 935.
86. For example, one limiting instruction that the district court offered during Agent
Hudson’s cross-examination was as follows:
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Such limiting instructions, however, are clearly insufficient. The
court should not have admitted the summary chart as evidence.
In addition, the court should not have allowed the government to
use such a summary chart because its use defeats the purpose of
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.87 The Rules were drafted to protect
the integrity of the trial process by ensuring fairness to both sides
by avoiding prejudice and ensuring judicial economy.88
What is even more surprising is the fact that the Johnson
court used Rule 611(a) to admit the summary chart.89 Because the
chart was merely a repetition of prior in-court testimony, its ad-
mission violated one of the tenets that Rule 611(a) itself estab-
lished—the avoidance of needless consumption of time.90 Having
Agent Hudson visually and verbally summarize the testimony of
thirty witnesses through the use of an organizational chart was
unquestionably a needless consumption of time.
In addition, the district court, using the same reasoning it had
applied to admit the chart, allowed Agent Hudson to orally sum-
marize the prior testimony of government witnesses as to particu-
lar events and persons.91 The court found that Hudson’s summary
testimony likely aided the jury in ascertaining the truth, and held
that the testimony was admissible because the defendant was
allowed extensive cross-examination concerning the validity of
Hudson’s testimony.92 The court cited two cases in support of its
decision to admit the summary testimony, United States v.
Baker93 and United States v. Paulino .94
                                                                                                             
The chart . . . is the Government’s analysis of the evidence. It is the case as the
Government sees it from the evidence which has been adduced here in the
courtroom, and, of course, it is subject to such interpretation as you as a jury
feel is appropriate to be given to it. In other words, it is presented to show what
the Government contends has been proven in the case. That is the contention.
It’s up to you then as a jury to resolve any issues that may be in your mind
concerning [the chart].
Johnson, 54 F.3d at 1160. The district court also charged the jury that “[g]overnment’s Ex-
hibit Number 19, that’s the chart that was put up, that is simply a summary of what the
Government contends that the evidence shows. In the final analysis, however, it is your own
recollection and interpretation of the evidence that controls in the case.” Id. at 1160-61.
87. The purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is to balance the admissibility of oth-
erwise admissible evidence in regards to its probative value versus the danger of unfair
prejudice to the defendant. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note. If the court finds the
danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value, the judge may give a limiting instruc-
tion to the jury regarding the evidence, or the court may exclude the evidence in its entirety. Id.
88. See FED. R. EVID. 403, 611(a).
89. Johnson, 54 F.3d at 1157.
90. FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
91. Johnson, 54 F.3d at 1161.
92. Id. at 1162.
93. 10 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 330 (1994).
94. 935 F.2d 739 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 914 (1991).
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B.   Summary Testimony as Admissible Evidence
In Baker, twenty-four defendants were charged with conspir-
acy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to dis-
tribute methamphetamines.95 Four of the defendants were
charged with conducting a continuing criminal enterprise.96 The
district court allowed the prosecution’s final witness, FBI Special
Agent Lee Besse, to attempt to establish the “substantial pro-
ceeds” element of the continuing criminal enterprise crime.97
Though no witness testified as to the value of any particular
transaction, Agent Besse projected values onto the transactions
and events and totaled known expenditures based upon the price
lists she had prepared from the testimony of prior witnesses.98
The trial judge instructed the jury that the summary testi-
mony was not evidence, did not represent the prosecution’s opin-
ion as to the credibility of the witnesses, and should be disre-
garded where the jury found that it conflicted with previously
admitted testimony and evidence.99 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
held that the admission of the summary evidence was a “valid ex-
ercise of the district court’s discretion under Rule 611(a)” and
that the summary testimony was not unduly prejudicial under
Rule 403.100
The Johnson court misconstrued Baker and incorrectly applied
it as support for the prejudicial decision to admit Agent Hudson’s
summary testimony. Agent Besse’s testimony in Baker did not
rehash word-for-word the prior in-court testimony of witnesses,
as Agent Hudson’s summary testimony did in Johnson.101 Rather,
the prosecution introduced Agent Besse’s testimony to tie its evi-
dence together through the agent’s calculations of what the prior
witnesses did not say.102 The testimony allowed the prosecution to
present its case-in-chief in accordance with the “theme” of its
case. Agent Besse’s testimony was simply another piece in the
puzzle the prosecutor put together before the jury. Her testimony
did not present prior witness testimony to the jury for a second
time, thus allowing a figure as authoritative as an F.B.I. agent to
reiterate the testimony for the jury in the event it did not “get it”
                                                                                                             
95. Baker, 10 F.3d at 1386.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1411.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1412.
101. Johnson, 54 F.3d at 1161.
102. Baker, 10 F.3d at 1411.
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the first time. Rather than merely putting the prior witnesses’
credibility at issue, Agent Besse’s testimony instead presented
another piece of the prosecution’s puzzle before the jury to aid it
in determining the credibility of Agent Besse’s testimony itself.
The second case the Johnson court cited in support of the ad-
mitted summary testimony was United States v. Paulino. 103 The
Paulino defendants appealed convictions for conspiring to possess
and distribute cocaine and possessing cocaine with intent to dis-
tribute.104 The defendants contended that the district court had
committed reversible error when it allowed the prosecution to have
a witness explain, through the use of summary charts, the various
players and their roles in the conspiracy, as well as the cash gener-
ated from cocaine sales during a certain period of time.105 The de-
fendants claimed that the summary testimony was “prejudicial,
inflammatory, and constituted impermissible argument.”106
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that the summaries were
admissible as pedagogical devices because they aided the jury in
its examination of testimony and documents already admitted
into evidence.107 The court cited Rule 611(a) as authority for al-
lowing such summaries, provided that a limiting instruction were
given.108 The court held that the district court properly allowed
the summary testimony because the charts were not substan-
tially inconsistent with the evidence.109 Moreover, the court found
that the trial judge had properly instructed the jury that the
charts and summaries were not evidence.110
The Johnson court erred in citing Paulino as support for its
holding that oral summaries of prior in-court witness testimony
                                                                                                             
103. 935 F.2d 739 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 914 (1991).
102. Id. at 743.
105. Id. at 752.
106. Id. at 752-53.
107. Id. at 753.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 754.
110. Id. Although the trial judge failed to give a cautionary instruction prior to the
summary witness’ testimony, the court did give the following jury instruction concerning
the nature of the summaries at the close of proofs:
The charts or summaries prepared by the United States and admitted in evi-
dence received for the purposes of explaining facts disclosed by books, records
and other documents which are in evidence in the case. Such charts or sum-
maries are not in and of themselves evidence or proof of any facts. If such
charts or summaries do not correctly reflect facts or figures shown by the evi-
dence in the case, the jury should disregard them. In other words, such facts or
summaries are used only as a matter of convenience. So, if and to the extent
that you find they are not, in truth, summaries of facts or figures shown by the
evidence in the case, you are to disregard them entirely.
Id.
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are admissible.111 The summary testimony the Paulino court ap-
proved summarized objective evidence , not evidence that put the
credibility of prior witnesses at issue. The summary witness in
Paulino testified about charts that summarized the amount of
cash generated from cocaine sales and reflected the roles that
various defendants played in the conspiracy.112 Not once did the
summary witness restate what prior witnesses had said in the
courtroom.113 As in Baker, the summary witness in Paulino sim-
ply put another piece of the prosecution’s puzzle before the jury to
allow it to determine whether the charts accurately depicted evi-
dence already admitted.
The summary testimony that the Johnson court approved,
however, gave the prosecution another chance to prove its case-
in-chief. The prosecution was allowed to present the same piece of
the puzzle a second time through the testimony of Agent Hud-
son.114 Neither the Baker nor Paulino courts put the credibility of
prior witnesses at stake a second time when they allowed sum-
mary testimony of objective evidence.
V.   CONCLUSION
By allowing Agent Hudson to testify about the summary
charts and prior testimony, the Johnson court violated Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 because the testimony unfairly prejudiced
the defendant, misled the jury, and was a needless presentation
of cumulative evidence that confused the jury. Further, the John-
son court exceeded its authority by expanding Rule 611(a). Ear-
lier decisions have held that to be admitted under Rule 611(a), a
summary must reflect objective evidence that does not put the
credibility of witnesses at issue.115 Moreover, the Johnson court
disregarded the Advisory Committee’s intent in drafting Federal
Rule of Evidence 611(a).116
Federal courts should not adopt Johnson as authority for ad-
mitting summaries. In addition, the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence should address the conflict that exists
among the circuits regarding Rule 611(a), clarify the scope and
                                                                                                             
111. Johnson, 54 F.3d at 1162.
112. Paulino, 935 F.2d at 752-53.
113. Id.
114. Johnson, 54 F.3d at 1161.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 330
(1993); United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 914 (1991);
United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867 and 488 U.S. 932
(1988); United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979).
116. See discussion supra part III.
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purpose of Rule 611(a), and state once and for all whether sum-
mary evidence is admissible under Rule 611(a). Finally, if the
Committee finds that summary evidence is admissible under
Rule 611(a), it should address under what circumstances such
evidence is to be admitted.
